But we were not yet in a position to assert that this situation is valid; moderately, the likelihood was still open to us of following Hume in the opposite path and concluding, from the dogmatic disjunction of the sources of knowledge, that metaphysical knowledge is not possible. That is true, to make certain, if we define intuition as nonreflective knowledge, but such a definition doesn’t correspond to linguistic utilization. It’s, to make certain, contradictory if someone claims to know that he is aware of nothing; however it doesn’t comply with, by any means, from this contradiction that he knows something; it follows solely that he does not know what he claims to know, specifically, that he knows nothing. The alternate options of the “principle of knowledge” and dogmatism, i.e., of the necessity of verifying every cognition and the necessity of positing some judgments with none verification, are, to be sure, inevitable as long as one adheres to the already refuted presupposition that every one cognitions are judgments. I do not assert the impossibility of the “principle of knowledge” so as to conclude that knowledge is inconceivable; fairly, I assert that this skeptical conclusion, that knowledge is inconceivable, is itself merely a consequence of the prejudice held by the proponents of a “principle of knowledge.” The contradiction I’ve pointed out is characteristic not solely of the constructive solution of the problem of the “principle of knowledge” but indeed of every supposed solution, and therefore additionally of the skeptical.

It is just after we have also refuted this empiristic consequence that we’re able, in reference to the exclusion of metaphysical logicism and mysticism, to conclude the existence of noniiituitive immediate knowledge. But the embarrassment of which this enigmatic science is to relieve us is merely a consequence of the confusion of knowledge with judgment. But if there isn’t any different verification of judgments except proof, no verification of judgments is possible at all; for all proof consists only within the tracing back of the judgment to be proved to unproved and unprovable judgments. Therefore, either there may be one other means of verifying judgments besides proof, or no verification of them is feasible in any respect. For if each cognition have been attainable solely on the bottom of another, we must always have to execute an infinite regression so as to reach any true cognition, and hence no verification of cognitions would be potential.

A proof is the tracing again of 1 judgment to a different that comprises the logical floor of the first. The word “judgment” is right here used in its normal sense to mean the assertion of a thought that is in itself problematic. This alone makes it possible, in “theories of knowledge,” unconsciously to foist off an analytic judgment as a synthetic one by expressing them both in the identical sentence. The reply to the query whether or not we possess valid knowledge — no matter what this reply may be — can only be sought in a artificial judgment, because it is anxious with a reality. If, however, one abandons the presupposition that each cognition is a judgment, the selection between a “principle of knowledge” and dogmatism disappears. However this science isn’t any “theory of knowledge”: it doesn’t itself include the basis of metaphysical judgments however only serves to bring it to light. The want to escape this problem is the actual cause why recourse had to be taken to the “principle of knowledge.” For, since metaphysics can obviously no extra contain in itself the premise of the validity of its judgments than can every other discipline, this basis had to be sought in another, greater self-discipline, which, nonetheless, in its flip may no more derive its content from mere reflection or intuition than metaphysics itself may.

A “validity criterion” is consequently unimaginable, and hence there will be no “theory of knowledge.” One need only take any instance so as to make the content material of this proof clearer. I maintain that a solution of this drawback is impossible, and that i prove this as follows: So as to resolve this problem, we must always must have a criterion by the application of which we may decide whether or not or not a cognition is true; I shall name it briefly the “validity criterion.” This criterion would itself either be or not be a cognition. However we could only know this if it had been obvious that the apparent cognitions are true; however, with a purpose to deduce the reality of this assumption from its obviousness, we must always already have had to presuppose that obviousness is a criterion of fact. I’ve stored my account energetic, although, as a result of it has helped me find jobs up to now.